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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1833 
___________ 
 
ROBERT FRIEDLAND, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE; DR. LOPEZ; JOHN DOE; JOE DOE; HILARY CLINTON;  
MR. SAMUELS; DR. MICHAEL NELSON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-12-cv-06010) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 1, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 8, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Robert Friedland, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District 
Court’s order denying, among others, his motion for an injunction and a temporary 
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restraining order, and his motion for a protective order.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we will summarily affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Friedland filed a complaint, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various 
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), its 
employees, and officials.1
In his motion for an injunction and a temporary restraining order, Friedland 
admitted that he was seen by several doctors, including a neurosurgeon.  They advised 
him that surgery was dangerous and requested another MRI.  (Dkt. No. 4, p. 3.)  
Friedland also claimed that he was seen at sick call thirty-five times over sixty days, but 
  Shortly thereafter, he filed a motion for an injunction and a 
temporary restraining order.  (Dkt. No. 4.)  His complaint and motion contained 
substantially the same allegations.  He claimed that when he entered the Federal 
Correctional Institution at Fort Dix (“FCI-Fort Dix”) on June 1, 2012, he was suffering 
from “a brain lesion, kidney disease, prostate issues, a damaged vagus nerve,” and 
stomach problems.  (Id. p. 1.)  After seeing a staff nurse and doctor, Friedland was sent 
for an MRI in August, 2012.  (Dkt. No. 1, p. 6.)  He alleged that the MRI revealed that a 
“brain lesion” he discovered prior to his incarceration had increased in size.  (Id.)  
Friedland claimed that he did not receive medical care, except for being given Tylenol.   
                                              
1 Presumably the District Court construed the case as being brought pursuant to Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which 
creates a cause of action against the federal government analogous to a § 1983 action 
against the states.  
 
3 
 
was not examined by a doctor except for the one time he was told “he was going to die or 
be brain damaged.”  (Id. p. 4.)  Friedland then started a grievance procedure with the 
BOP because he claimed he was only being treated for his brain lesion and high blood 
pressure, while his “other illnesses” were ignored.  (Id.) 
The District Court held a hearing on March 1, 2013, to address Friedland’s 
numerous motions.  After listening to testimony and argument from the parties, the 
District Court denied Friedland’s motion for an injunction and a temporary restraining 
order, and his motion for a protective order.  (Dkt. Nos. 4, 18.)  His motions to compel 
discovery, for entry of default and summary judgment, and for “immediate release and 
notice of short hearing” were also denied.  (Dkt. Nos. 18, 20, 21, 33.)  Friedland timely 
appealed.  (Dkt. No. 39.) 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the District Court’s 
denial of Friedland’s motion for an injunction and a temporary restraining order, and his 
motion for a protective order, but not over the other orders from which he appeals.2
                                              
2With certain exceptions not relevant here, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing “final 
decisions.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  A decision generally is final only when it “ends the 
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”  
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 376 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation and 
quotation marks omitted).  The District Court’s denial of Friedland’s motions to compel 
discovery, for entry of default and summary judgment, and for immediate release are not 
final orders.  
 
  See 
Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 
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2012); United States v. Santini, 963 F.2d 585, 591 (3d Cir. 1992).  We review the denial 
of a motion for an injunction and a temporary restraining order for abuse of discretion, 
though we review the underlying factual findings for clear error and underlying legal 
conclusions de novo.3
 In this case, the District Court concluded that Friedland had not shown a 
likelihood of success on the merits.  We perceive no abuse of discretion.  We agree with 
the District Court that Friedland’s Eighth Amendment claims required a showing of 
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by the BOP, and that he failed to 
make that showing.  See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).  Friedland testified, 
and the record reflected, that the BOP routinely addressed and treated all of his medical 
complaints.  For example, Friedland admitted that after reporting to sick call and 
complaining of a rash, he received a prescription for Prednisone and blood pressure 
medication.  (Tr. from March 1, 2013 hearing (“Tr.”) at 37:4-12.)   He also admitted that 
he was given an MRI, received an x-ray of his abdomen after complaining of a history of 
kidney stones, had his blood drawn for a PSA test, saw a neurosurgeon and urologist, and 
received Toradol shots for his headaches.  (Tr. at 37:13-39:2; 40:3-20.)  The District 
  Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d at 366.  A plaintiff seeking an 
injunction must show, among other factors, a likelihood of success on the merits, and the 
failure to do so “must necessarily result in the denial of a preliminary injunction.”  Id. 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). 
                                              
3 We also review the District Court’s denial of a protective order for abuse of discretion.  
Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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Court noted that Friedland had “piles of medical records” with him at the hearing 
pertaining to his treatment at FCI-Fort Dix. (Id. at 43:13-14.)  Further, the neurosurgeon’s 
reports stated that Friedland did not need surgery.  (Id. at 50:13-14).     
For all of the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that there was “no 
proof” that the BOP acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.  (Tr. 
at 78:3-79:25.)  The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that 
Friedland was not likely to prevail on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claims and, 
therefore, he was not entitled to an injunction, temporary restraining order, or protective 
order. 4
                                              
4 There was some discussion during the March 1, 2013 hearing regarding Friedland’s 
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the District Court may have intended 
to dismiss his complaint on that basis.  (Tr. at 81:21-82:10).  However, the District 
Court’s order specifically denies only Friedland’s pending motions, and does not mention 
his complaint.  (Dkt. No. 36.)  For purposes of this appeal, the language in the order is 
controlling.  See, e.g., Eakin v. Continental Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 875 F.2d 114, 
118 (7th Cir. 1989) (“In the event of a conflict between the opinion and judgment, the 
judgment controls.”).   
 (Tr. at 79:25.)  Because Friedland did not demonstrate a likelihood of success, we 
need not address the other injunction factors.  Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d at 366. 
III. 
Because no substantial question is presented on appeal, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Friedland’s motions for an 
injunction, a temporary restraining order, and a protective order.  All pending motions are 
denied.   
